

Figure 10.10 Values in process and reproduction schema

This possibility provides no guarantee that things will turn out well. If the laws of nominal wage and profit formation are not adapted to the evolution of production norms, disequilibrium arises. The stream of values in process seems thus to 'overflow' the reproduction schema's growth in value or, on the contrary, to turn out lower than its potential growth. In the economic fabric, folds and holes appear: inflation or overproduction appears. Thus arises the problem of adapting the stream to the regime, the woof to the warp. Adaptation is the effect of the regulation mode in force, which plays, in the weaving metaphor, the role of the loops or ... of Adam Smith's 'invisible hand'.

The purpose of economic research on regulation, and especially of the CEPREMAP report (1977) and its derivatives, was to show that the 'invisible hand' was not a trans-historical mechanism of perfectly pure competition. Modes of regulation (comprising forms of direct and indirect wage determination, inter-company competition and co-ordination, and money management) change over time, as do forms of growth and the self-piloting of values in process. As an accumulation regime itself changes, major crises can arise from the inappropriateness of its regulation mode. Such major crises (like the current crisis, or that of the 1930s) are to be distinguished from cyclical 'minor crises' which are the very form of regulatory action in so-called 'competitive' modes.²⁷ As for 'intentionality' in the institution of an adapted regulation mode, such as 'monopolistic regulation' in the Fordist regime, these works have shown that, historically, it is most often a question of 'lucky finds' which are consciously consolidated over time by 'Keynesian' theoreticians of Fordist regulation, reformist unions and governments seeking to preserve social consensus.

Conversely, understanding how the major crisis of Fordism (for example) arose, that is, how its 'fabric' was torn, implies a two-fold task. At a profound level, one finds a progressive deformation of the macroeconomic structure: a

slowdown in productivity gains, an increase in the organic composition of capital, and rising internationalization. At an 'exogenous' level, one tries to show how the socio-economic actors – in their struggles to 'change the rules of the game' within the logic of that development model, as well as in their attempts to change that model by appealing to a 'nature' which is incompatible with this model – accumulated divergences. Unions tried to make wage increases more and more automatic, and consolidate Welfare State benefits; they thus carried out offensive measures within the model. But wage-earners increasingly resisted alienating forms of the Fordist organization of work. To counter these tendencies, business people tried to increase scale of production, accelerate automation (a strategy within Fordist logic), but also to relocate production in countries with regulation modes that were more favourable to profits, circumventing social legislations by 'polarizing' labour markets: a form of denunciation by flight (exit ...) from Fordist institutionalized compromises.

The result of these divergent strategies is well known. What is important here is to understand that it is not a question of an unfortunate disruption of consensus that a bit of good will could have smoothed over. The contradiction lay within the regime itself.

4 The Fabric of Space-Time

Having already discussed love and capitalist accumulation, I will now take up a third field: human geography. I will also change cultures here: my references will be to Anglo-Saxon critical geography, an excellent epistemological opus of which can be found in D. Gregory and J. Urry's collection of articles (1985). The problem of establishing a dialogue between cultures because of the language barrier, second-hand knowledge and approximate translations has led to misunderstandings which are really superseded only in Ed Soja's remarkable contribution (1985). Despite ritualistic and often hardly relevant criticism of Althusserism, it is difficult to see what is really new (when compared with Althusserian overdetermination) in 'theoretical realism' – according to which objects have 'causal powers' owing to their internal structures which are realized only as a function of their contingent contextual articulations.²⁸ Similarly, it is difficult to see where Bourdieu's 'constructivist structuralism' differs from Giddens's 'theory of structuration', but most writers included in the collection (especially Walker 1985) agree that they are the same.

What should attract our attention is the direct use made of the warp-woof metaphor. In critical geography, its originator was Hägerstrand (1970), discussed by Giddens (1985) and Gregory (1985). Hägerstrand presents his 'space-time geography' as a micro-sociology, based on routinized 'choreography' of individual trajectories by agents subject to the constraints of their spatial-temporal materiality. These trajectories combine to form bundles at the 'stations' where they interact. The projection of these trajectories into planar-space produces the structuration of space.




Figure 10.11 Hågerstrand's choreography

Let us take the example of young villagers (Paul and Virginie) who go to school everyday. We see the 'woof' of trajectories structured by (and structuring) the 'warp': the system of the village's 'stations' (see Fig. 10.11). One can even throw this schema into a 'minor crisis'. Paul invites Virginie to play truant in grove B, and gossip soon brings the little devil and his Cinderella back to their normal trajectories. Tattling and sanctions constitute the most primitive forms of social regulation. But the divergence can be developed so far as to set off a major crisis, upon which our love birds will either get engaged and leave school (see Fig. 10.12) or be sent to boarding school.




Figure 10.12 Divergence, minor and major choreographic crises

The operational character of Hågerstrand's 'space-time geography' becomes clear here, as does the way it can lead to methods of urbanist projection, as for example the conception of a transport system [Matzner and Rusch (1976)]. Giddens nonetheless points out its weaknesses. It neglects the origin of 'projects' which guide trajectories, or else views them as caused by the stations themselves which are 'already given'; one thus falls back into the totalitarianism

of the 'warp'. Giddens proposes to replace the stations by 'centres' endowed with 'presence availability' which he analyses as Goffman (1959) might have. In our example, one could say that the grove present the availability of 'girl-chasing', carried out or not depending on the amorous impulses of the village boys. But the grove exists prior to their impulses, and this prohibits any attempt at 'micro-sociological grounding' in localization.²⁹

D. Gregory criticizes (in accordance with a theme that must by now be familiar to the reader) the tendency to reduce the spatial warp to the functional necessities of capitalist structure. He distrust just as thoroughly the opposite tendency (based on the chronic instability of structurations, brought on by permanent innovation), seeing in the movement of the woof's threads only an intertwined tangle. He concludes that contradiction and struggle must be understood within structuration itself (another theme with which we are familiar), and D. Gregory introduces here the Sartrean notion of *seriality* which Hägerstrand did not, according to Gregory, get beyond. 'Seriality' (opposed to the state of 'groups in fusion' – (Sartre 1960) is the state of individuals behaving like Democritus' determinate atoms, deprived of 'clinamen', and incapable of a collective project leading to the modification of structures. We must therefore be careful not to identify the 'warp' with necessity and the 'woof' with freedom! I'll come back to this point in my conclusion.

For the moment, I would like to discuss two examples from my studies which will allow me to clarify, in other fields of human geography, both the warp-woof distinction and the question of regulation.

The first concerns the regional question, or rather that of inter-regionality, a subject about which I disagree intermittently and amicably with Doreen Massey. In a first paper (1974a, taken up again in 1977) I defined French regions for themselves by their genealogies, the histories of the internal social relations which moulded their 'personalities' in the terms of Vidal de la Blache), and endowed them with availabilities differentiated in terms of the forms of the division of labour that characterized, after 1945, that which I hadn't yet called 'French-style Fordism'. Fordism, as a form of the organization of labour, in fact allows for a disjunction between design, skilled fabrication, and unskilled assembly. France, with its regions highly differentiated in terms of wages, unions, skilled labour and markets, was greatly tempted to deploy the circuits of productive branches over three kinds of labour levels, in conformity with the Fordist tripartition. And it succumbed, with the regions themselves 'calling' for industrial jobs, and the Regional Planning Agency directing the choices of big businesses (a regulation problem I won't go into here). Three types of regions could thus be defined relationally according to branch circuit structures, certain regions, in conformity with their inherited 'styles', coming to take on 'roles' defined within this structure. For example, one finds type I: the greater Paris area; type II: the Nord-Pas de Calais; type III: the West.

D. Massey (1978) criticized the ambiguity stemming from using one approach based on the warp and another on the woof: 'Lipietz's regions seem at times to be defined in themselves – in their genealogy – and at others by their synchronic place at the heart of the inter-regional division of labor'. To Massey

only the second alternative is valid – as long as one does not overly simplify the ‘warp’ of this structure – in recognizing (something I willingly accept) the existence of many forms of labour organization, varying from branch to branch and even within each branch, combining in contingent ways in explaining the fate of each region by the accumulation of ‘genealogical layers’. Massey applied this method in her book (Massey and Meegan 1982) in which I immediately detected (1983c) a tendency to reduce geography to industrial organization. How, I objected, can one explain the variable success of different regions faced with industrial restructuring, if one does not take into account the character and availability of regions, inherited from accumulated genealogical ‘layers’? A declining skilled industry region can either convert by mobilizing its ‘human resources’ (for example, the Ruhr area), or by evolving towards unskilled industry (for example, the Lorraine area). The precise path of development depends on many factors, but first and foremost on whether the region forms a political coalition capable of carrying out industrial renovation (Lipietz 1985).

Massey (1985) wholeheartedly agreed with this critique and went so far as to affirm – upon the publication of a balance sheet on developments in industrial geography (very similar to the summary of the ‘structure/agency’ debate in the first part of this chapter – the importance of pre-existing spatial realities in the inter-regional restructuring process. ‘The unique is back on the agenda’ – here again we see the influence of Vidal de la Blache!

I tried to show (in 1985a) that, in the case of international economic relations, the autonomy of national trajectories is even greater (than in the case of inter-regional relations) when compared with the structure of the totality. As opposed to the classical ‘centre/periphery’ structure, as well as the orthodoxy of the New International Division of Labour inspired by the Fordist tripartition (Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreyes 1980), one must advance the notion of an ‘international configuration’ (a much softer version of the ‘warp’), wherein are traced vague regularities in transfers (of populations, commodities, knowledge, and capital) between autonomous national accumulation regimes (which here play the role of the ‘warp’). I even tried to study what the possible forms of regulation for this warp/woof duality and its crises could be, namely commercial agreements, transnational companies, international credit, and so on.

I would, however, here like to raise the question of spatial regulation as a last example. It concerns the transformation of urban neighbourhoods. In a first study, considerably inspired by structuralism, on land rent (1974b), I presupposed the existence of a ‘warp’: the Spatial Economic Division of Labour (here the workers, there the *petit bourgeois*, over there the superior tertiary sector buildings, and so on). This SEDS is reproduced and transformed by the practice of real-estate agents. But what should they construct in such and such a place? I showed that the mechanism of land prices, as resulting from the pre-existing SEDS (the ‘exogenous differential land tribute’), obliges agents to reproduce the social use of a neighbourhood, or at most to locate ‘superior’ uses in nearby neighbourhoods that were formerly less highly rated. But what

can then be said of large-scale urban redevelopment projects which change, in one fell swoop, the social use of a neighbourhood, or which at least are effectuated according to long-term planning co-ordinating several (private and public) sectors? Here, the land rent (said to be 'endogenous intensive differential') must be divided between the agents in accordance with the product of the projected space: the agents internalize the result of their future co-operation, dividing up the fruits of the completed transformation. In a later article (1975), I termed these two forms of spatial reproduction-transformation 'competitive' and 'monopolistic', not yet having the term 'regulation' at my disposal.³⁰

Stated otherwise, the 'competitive/monopolistic' couple refers to two modalities used by 'woof' agents to regulate their relations in a warp which changes shape in the course of their practices. Either the 'warp' is viewed as 'already given', and thus the 'map' of their space of representation (here the land prices) allows each of them to make 'rational' decisions contributing to the reproduction of the structure or its slight alteration; or else the 'map' anticipates macro-transformations of the 'warp' which can be brought about by their own explicitly co-ordinated actions, and this collective projected space becomes the economic landscape of individual projects. The spatial-temporal metaphors (and what are those of weaving?) thus close in on themselves ...

By Way of Conclusion

The preceding argument may be summarized in the following way. There are two different possible points of view about a social process which appears to have a certain regularity. First of all, one can account for it as the reproduction over time of a relation, or of a complex of reciprocally overdetermined relations. Second, one can understand it as the juxtaposition and interaction of individual trajectories of agents (or groups) following their own goals in accordance with a representation of the consequences of their interaction. It is irrelevant here whether this representation be appropriate or not, or whether the coherence of their actions be an unintended effect of their conscious aims. It is also irrelevant whether the relations be hierarchical (oppressive) or co-operative.

As long as all goes well (the phenomenon reproducing itself 'within a regime'), the two interpretations are compatible. Agent's projects and constraints are the products of a habitus and a space of representation generated by the very reproduction of the structure. But the structure is nothing but a conceptualization of the observed compatibility of individual trajectories. The metaphor of the warp (the reproduction of relations) and the woof (individual trajectories), aims at making one see this duality.

This becomes interesting only because the agents 'defined' by relations have the capacity, and even the tendency, to diverge in their actions from the requirements of social reproduction. These divergences are resolved by a mode of regulation, unless they accumulate to the point of setting off a 'major crisis'

Minor crises ('within' regulation) themselves contribute to altering the structure until a major crisis breaks out.

The existence of divergences and crises in no way leads to the dethroning of structures or actions, some of them simply giving way to others. On the contrary, it points to the autonomy, irreducibility, or reality, as it were, of the two aspects. There can be no divergence without structure (there would in fact be only chaos). There can be no structure without routinized action or without a founding agreement (whether willed or submitted to). One must still account of autonomy, and even for the possible individualization of agents, especially as we have admitted that individuals and groups can function as 'agents'.

The individualization of agents playing a 'role' – in a place defined by the structure, but in accordance with personal 'styles' – poses a first set of problems. A relation can define a system of places which are 'in themselves' individualized: lovers, social classes and regions. But the capacity of these 'individuals' to act 'for themselves' is problematic. When the individuality in question is collective, whether it be that of a class, big business or region, the problem of aggregation obviously arises, that is, that of 'collective consciousness' (for which theories as diverse as those involving class consciousness, delegation, principal agents, and hegemonic block try to account). But when the 'individual' is a human individual, the 'splitting of the subject' (*Ichspaltung*), dear to psychoanalysis, poses as many problems as aggregation in the understanding of this individual as subject. Alceste is torn between his misanthropic ego and his amorous ego. In short, contradictory relations set in opposition *knots* of contradiction at their poles. A national accumulation regime is a contradiction which is reproduced in time, but it can be considered, within the framework of a worldwide configuration, as an individuality in a contradictory relation with others of the same type. Agents' particular 'styles' are products of the articulated relations that define them, lying both inside and outside of themselves.

An individual is certainly not a class or a nation, but can, no more than they, be reduced to an atom capable of rational individualism ('you don't know what you want!'). One could obviously appeal to the hierarchical organization of the real. But then the question arises of 'internal causes' and 'external causes': must one view a wage-earner as a living contradiction externally overdetermined by his/her relation to capital, or as a place in wage relations, encumbered with a 'style' inherited from outside determinations? This amounts to a relativism that can be resolved only by using the criterion of relevance: does one construct the history as that of the life of Ali, a marabout's son working at Citroën, or as an analysis of problems of human management?

The goal of this first group of questions is to recall the importance of the notion of 'overdetermination'. As 'actors' are involved in many relations, or are themselves a condensation of relations, they enter into the relation which defines them from a certain vantage point with an always already given 'individuality' that *changes* owing to their entering (and remaining) in this relation (loving affection, Imperial England, or the female working class), but which all the same gives specific concrete form to that relation which can

modify or transform it: for example, the liberal professions were not incorporated into wage-labour without changing some of the latter's norms.

Once individuality is agreed to, what is one to say of the autonomy of agents in relation to their roles? An easy and generally relevant answer consists in appealing to that aspect of individuality which is not defined by the relation: the participation in a different 'nature' or overdetermination by other relations. Young people refuse Taylorism because they have other areas of interest. Célimène doesn't listen to Alceste because she enjoys fashionable circles. An opposite, and just as relevant, answer appeals to the relation's internal contradiction, and individual's irreducible aspiration to freedom: Taylorism is a negation of human dignity and perhaps of productive efficiency), and love cannot justify self-effacement (nor can it survive such an eventuality). Behaviour adequate to relations generally prevails, nonetheless, for otherwise the world would be in a terrible mess. And when it prevails, the warp-wool duality identifies actions and structures that can be distinguished only by the methodological point of view, reading, as it does, along the longitudinal (diachronic) and transversal (synchronic) axes.

This is a fundamental point: at the most profound level, the contradiction is *not* between structure and agency. It lies within agency itself, between its routinized, reified and reproductive facet (and thus, by duality, one immediately has the structure) and its potentially divergent, innovative, autonomy, generative and perhaps revolutionary (but at least inciting) one. That is the contradiction Lucretius and Epicurus were aiming at with the ideal of 'clinamen', that Karl Marx was aiming at in his *Theses on Feuerbach*; Karel Kosik in his dialectic of the concrete; Jean-Paul Sartre in his *Théorie des ensembles pratiques*; and Pierre Bourdieu in his definition of 'constructivist structuralism'.³¹

Towards the end of his life – I don't recall exactly where or when – Fernand Braudel explained that the weight of the oldest routines encumber our present like the Amazon's alluvia colour the ocean for hundreds of miles around its estuary. In our history, based on given conditions inherited from the past, humans perhaps have the right to at most a 5 per cent 'clinamen' (or degree of freedom) and a 95 per cent necessity factor. But this 5 per cent calls forth and creates new and perhaps better social forms.

Notes

- 1 I am writing here only of the ontological theses, not the epistemological ones, and I am considering only 'classical' Althusserism – that of *Reading Capital* (Althusser et al., 1965). For an in-depth discussion see Lipietz and Rouilleault (1972) and Lipietz (1973 and 1979a).
- 2 Aglietta's book (1976) which came out after the seminar, gave first place back to market relations which went on to have increasing importance in his work.
- 3 I devoted many pages of my book (1979a) to distinguishing my conception of regulation from functionalism, and to grounding regulation in dialectics. In the second edition of his book, Michel Aglietta (1976), like Boyer (1987), confirmed his agreement with my critique of functionalism.

Let me make one comment all the same: students should be warned against functionalism, i.e. the belief that the result of a mechanism or institution is the cause of its existence. At the stage of research, when, for example, one unpacks an unknown apparatus, it is nonetheless helpful to ask two basic functionalistic questions: (a) How does it all work? And (b) What is each piece there for?

- 4 See for example the Organum in the *Encyclopaedia Universalis*.
- 5 See M. Guillaume (ed.), 1987.
- 6 J. Rancière, in his contribution to *L'empire du sociologue*, simply reduces Bourdieu's sociology to his own former position, as express in *Reading Capital*: 'The practical meaning [of agents] is never anything but a ruse of reason ... The system reproduces its existence because it is misunderstood'. Now 'practical meaning', 'habitus' and 'strategy' in Bourdieu's work, which reintroduce agent, action and practice, imply (according to C. Lévi-Strauss) a critique of structuralism 'which winds up everywhere and takes its inspiration from fashionable spontaneism and subjectivism' (cf. Bourdieu 1987, pp. 77-8).
- 7 See 'Le mariage dans la société du haut Moyen-Age' in Duby (1988).
- 8 While Luc Boltanski, in *Les cadres*, deploys all the generative and even transformational potential borne by the concept of habitus, countering a mechanist view of reproduction, he nonetheless does not forget the exploitative relations (in the Marxist sense of the term) that underlie 'grading struggles', like geology underlies geomorphology. Unfortunately, his most recent work (Boltanski and Thevenot 1987), however adept, suggestive and 'operational' it may be, seems to mark a move towards an exclusively 'external' (exoteric) – and thus individualist – approach to social relations. I will come back to this point. This same movement (in conformity with the general trend) is also present in Aglietta and Orlean (1982), my divergences from whom I have explained in (1983a and b).
- 9 In their innovative work, Boltanski and Thevenot (1987) take on the task of going beyond the 'methodological individualism/collectivism' dilemma, and more precisely of dealing with 'problem, central to social science, of the possibility of agreement between a society's members, if one takes seriously the question of legitimacy, without abandoning it by adopting an explanation on the basis of contingency, cheating and power' (p. 00). They thus construct a grammar of the forms of agreement collected in political theory and in good behaviour guides. These agreements correspond to 'cities' and 'natures'. In the first few pages, they observe that the city form is not the only possible (there is the 'cosmos' and 'chaos' which are unaware of the 'common humanity' of those with equal rights, who agree on a social order). But their reservations are progressively forgotten in later pages. The condition of the 'commerce of men' definitively takes the form of inter-individual agreement. In reality, this marks a return to a variation of methodological individualism that eliminates conflicts intrinsic to social relations, which takes a back seat when compared with Bourdieu's intention (1987, p. 55) to study 'real situations in which consensual submission comes about in and through conflict'.
- 10 A word of epistemology here: despite his ritualistic deference to Lenin's critiques of empiro-criticism, Althusser did not confuse the real concrete and the concrete of thought, i.e. he did not think that abstract relations were present within empirical reality, hidden in the gauge? Of contingencies. Structuralism leads one, however, to believe in the *existence* of fundamental hidden structures which are *realer* than the mystified behaviour of the agents they 'direct'. I criticized (1985a and b, 1987b)

- the dangers of this 'realism of the concept', in my own conceptual formulations as well, such as 'Fordism' and 'peripheral Fordism'.
- 11 Our theatrical example introduces complications, for the theatre makes for a cascade of interpretations. Starting from a deep narrative schema, present in works as different as the *Misanthrope* and *Gone with the Wind*, writers endow their characters (their place holders) with very different personalities. Directors and actors in turn interpret these personalities with their own styles. One could object, as do narratologists, that literary narratives have their own structures and laws of movement, which differ from those of social reality. I must assume here that, if life is not a novel, Molière's theater is life itself.
 - 12 This is not only the case in the lineage and segmentary societies analysed by African scholars, but also in the French nobility of the Middle Ages (Duby 1988) and even in the Bearnais peasantry. The *Misanthrope* constitutes a considerable cultural revolution in that the love relationship appears therein as a 'sociologically pure' form, i.e. independently of lineage relations which were still at the forefront of classical theatre and did not die out until Marivaux (cf. Lipietz 1988).
 - 13 'Your eyes are enough to persuade you
If only they could look at me for but a moment' (Racine, *Phèdre* II, 5).
 - 14 On the importance of intellectual coding in social relations, i.e. what Bourdieu calls 'effects of theory' (1987, pp. 93 and 164), see Lipietz (1985b).
 - 15 My distinction here between 'place', 'role' and 'style' owes a great deal to long and fruitful discussions with Jane Jenson. 'Style' is an actor's own way of playing a role. His/her own characteristic way is not entirely determined by the relation, but by experience and the other 'natures' in which the actor participates.
 - 16 'Why not say habit? Habit is spontaneously taken to be repetitive, mechanical, automatic and more reproductive than productive. Now I mean to insist on the idea that habitus is something that is powerfully generating. Habitus is, briefly stated, a product of conditioning which tends to reproduce the objective logic of conditioning, but in making it undergo transformation; it is a type of transformational machine which makes us "reproduce" the social conditions of our own production, but in a relatively unpredictable way, i.e. in such a way that one cannot simply and mechanically move from knowledge of productive conditions to knowledge of products', Bourdieu (1986, p. 134).
 - 17 K. Marx, *The Difference between Democritus' and Epicurus' Philosophies of Nature*, (French translation, Ducros, Bordeaux, 1970, p. 243).
 - 18 Even in 'cold' societies, accusations or suspicion of 'sorcery' or 'possession' by a demon (who must be exorcized) target deviance which is at times virtually imperceptible (see the tiny revolt of a young girl in the film *Remparts d'Argile* by Bertucelli and Duvigaud).
 - 19 Robert Linhart, in *L'établi* (1978), realizes this as soon as he meets his factory friends away from the assembly line. But he also shows that it is not just anyone who can bear assembly line work, and that the line is not designed for everyone. One could go further: in a capitalist economy in which there are skilled workers willing to 'commit themselves', it is not 'efficient', from a capitalistic point of view, to push too far one's recourse to Taylorism.
 - 20 The expression 'to realize oneself' borrowed from a psychology one could describe as 'old-fashioned', is here used on purpose in reference to 'realization', i.e. the validation of commodities in exchange.
 - 20.5 This is why it is better to use the 'game' metaphor with care. As Bourdieu notes (1987, p. 82), (immanent) social *regularities* are not all (transcendental) 'rules of

the game', even if there are (customary and juridical) 'laws'. To avoid implying a transcendence of the rules, and thus leave agents the possibility of progressively changing the rules of the game in the course of the game itself, Bowles and Gintis (1986) write of 'recurrent games'. The disadvantage of this is that one thus risks flattening into the same level what we are trying here to distinguish as 'relations', 'regimes', 'regulation modes' and 'trajectories', and thereby no longer understanding how divergence from a regime can lead to crisis, or why the problem of regulation arises. One can imagine, for example, an alternative play in which Alceste would throw himself into Eliante's arms right after the first fight, or Célimène, while upset, would 'drop' Alceste: but it wouldn't be the same story, nor the same love regime, nor perhaps the same relation.

- 21 In accordance with their non-dialectical conception of agreement, Boltanski and Thevenot (1987, chapter 4) cannot explain the appearance of 'points of contention' or the 'retraction' of agreements, except by the idea that agents participate in several 'natures'. They thus veer towards E. Balibar's structuralist position in *Reading Capital* which can explain crises only by the play of external relations among themselves. Aglietta and Orlean's 'conflictual' methodological individualism, on the contrary, is able to register contradiction and the necessity of crises (and of regulation) at the core of each relation. To do so, they have taken their inspiration from René Girard's work on 'violence and the sacred'. The problem is that Girard himself only abusively generalizes his own research (1961) on the literary treatment of love relationships as described by Da Ponte ('I am seeking something outside myself, I know not who has it, nor do I know what it is'). Transposed into economy, this works rather well for speculation on bonds, but not so well for 'real' economics.
- 22 The fundamental, though somewhat misunderstood, distinction in Marx's work between esoteric and exoteric is the basis of my book (1983a).
- 23 'The intellectualist and theorist error permanently threatening social science – i.e. the structuralist error – is the one that consists in saying: "I know better than the indigenous peoples what they are like"' (Bourdieu 1987, p. 114).
- 24 Sociology, like economy, *must* account for this 'exoteric' world, that of agents' lived experience (this is, for example, the object of book III *Capital*). It is world in which each agent perceives other agents occupying other places of the same relation, in 'exteriority', like elements of a space of representation with which he will 'interact'. This world has manifest laws which must be inventoried, but without forgetting its bond of dual dependence on the esoteric. 'Sociology is an esoteric science which, however, seems exoteric' (Bourdieu 1987, p. 68). Thence the charm and the temptation to flirt (as I have done throughout this analysis of *Le Misanthrope*) with Boltanski and Thevenot's terminology. My suspicion is that their terminology of the exoteric does not overlap with any kind of esoteric sociology.
- 25 We are of course dealing here with a schema that abstracts the 'intercapitalist' accumulation-investment loops, and other social relations tied to the reproduction of wage relations (e.g. patriarchy at the M ... F level).
- 26 One can show that with constant production norms, and data concerning behaviour and exoteric laws (in this case: equalization of profit rates among branches, the constancy of the sharing rate of value added), the accumulation regime and price system are simultaneously determined (Lipietz 1979b). This demonstration combines Frobenius' theorem and Brouwer fixed point theorem: it is thus simply a theorem of *existence* and not of stability!!

- 27 In the fourth part of this paper it will become clear why I have proposed this pair of terms – competitive/monopolistic – to distinguish two main types of regulation modes. This terminology may seem unfortunate.
- 28 Thus Urry (1985, p. 27) criticizes Althusser for neglecting the fact that structures have no effect but through their interdependence, and that ‘the degree to which their respective causal powers [more or less Althusser’s structural causality] are expressed within particular events is a contingent matter’. Such neglect of Althusser’s overdetermination is all the more striking in that his seminal article ‘Contradiction and Overdetermination’ in *For Marx* (1965), Althusser himself took off from Mao Tse-tung’s geopolitical texts! In reality, ‘theoretical realism’ is so similar to Althusser’s position in *For Marx* that it is subject to the same criticism. D. Massey (1985) had already mentioned her worry, in concluding, that economics (= structures) risked being assimilated with necessity, and geography (= overdetermination) with contingency. Advancing this critique of neo-structuralism (even when it respects overdetermination), Saunders and Williams (1986) see therein a ‘neo-conservatism’: from Althusser to theoretical realism, they think that agency has been reintroduced only to submit agents’ acts to the determinism of ‘causal powers’, tempered by contingency left to empiricism, and to leave aside (as usual) autonomy, agents’ projects, etc.
- 29 The butterfly hunt also exists as a scenario before any interaction takes place (see P. Faure and G. Brassens). More generally, the structuration of space which is ‘always already given’ is an insurmountable obstacle for methodological individualism (see Lipietz 1977, chapter 5).
- 30 These forms of urban transformations have, nevertheless, turned out to be more complicated and ambiguous than I originally thought. See, for example, Kaszynski (1982) and Somekh (1987).
- 31 In his definition of constructivist structuralism (1987, p. 147 ff) one finds an implicit theoretical anthropology similar to that of all these writers, which H. Rouilleault and I (1972) formerly thought we could mobilize against Althusser in conceptualizing transformational action of the masses in history, without losing structuralism’s import. The study of society as reproduction or routinized action thus seems to be partially legitimate, e.g. in the academic framework (a ‘necessary moment of research’ as Bourdieu says). The other, subjective facet of agency requires, on the contrary, participation in, or at least ‘sympathy’ (in the etymological sense) for, transformational social practices on the theoretician’s part (cf. Lipietz 1973, 1977a, Introduction).

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